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0. Introduction
In this paper I discuss some ideas for the analysis and interpretation of the Russian Dative
Impersonal Reflexive Construction (DIRC) in (1), which contrasts with the regular active
version in (2).
(1) mne     ne     çitaetsja1 (2) ja     ne      çitaju
me:Dat  not  read:3sgPRES.RFL        I:Nom not  read:1sgPRES
 “I don’t read / I’m not reading”
The main characteristics of DIRC in (1) are the following:2
1. First,what seems to be the subject appears in the Dative. So, (3), with the Nominative ja
instead of the Dative mne, is ungrammatical (but compare with the grammatical
(2)).
(3) *ja       ne      çitaetsja   
        I:Nom   not   read:3sgPRES.RFL 
2. Second, the presence of the reflexive suffix -sja, is required:3
(4) *mne    ne    çitaet
me:Dat  not  read:3sgPRES
* My most sincere thanks to  Sergey Avrutin and Natasha Kondrashova, who not only gave me judgements
but also had enough patience to answer my questions and discuss these issues with me; to Catherine
Chvany, who shared her ideas with me; and to Olga Brown for her time and judgements. Of course, all
errors are mine.
1Since the interpretation of DIRC is controversial and, precisely, the object of discussion in section 1., I
will avoid giving any translation for it and, instead, will only provide word-by-word glosses until the matter
is settled.
2This is not to say that these are the only properties of DIRC. There are other properties that have been
observed with respect to DIRC (cf. Schoorlemmer 1994), but the ones in (3)-(8) are the ones that I consider
crucial to grasp the essence of the configuration.
3This suffix has two allomorphs: -sja is used after consonant and -s’ after vowel. Like its Romance
counterpart SE, this suffix appears in a variety of configurations: reflexive/reciprocals; pronominal verbs; as
an intransitivizer; and to form (medio)pasives, among others.
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3. Third,  the verb shows up in the default 3rd person singular. This means that there is no
Person or Number agreement present. So,  (5) with a 1st person singular marker in
the verb is ungrammatical.
(5) *mne    ne    çitajus’
me:Dat  not  read:1sgPRES.RFL
Also, in the past, where there is Gender agreement, the marking on the verb is
always Neuter:
(6) Mne      ne      çitalos’  4
me:DAT   not   read:NeutPAST.RFL
4. An adverb may appear, as in (7)
(7) mne xoroßo çitaetsja
me:Dat  well  read:3sgPRES.RFL
5. And, finally but most importantly, the expression in (1) carries modality. In the words
of Borras and Christian (1971), “disinclination or incapacity to perform an action”.
This has usually been rendered with any of the three alternatives in (8):
(8) i.  I don’t feel like reading
ii. I’m not in the mood for reading
iii. I can’t read
However, the inadequacies of these expressions to fully capture the kind of
modality in (1) will become apparent immediately.
From all the properties in (3) thru (8), the crucial one and the one to be the backbone of my
analysis is precisely the last one, the modality carried by (1).
The goal of this paper is twofold: first, to establish the meaning of (1); and, subsequently,
to propose an analysis that both yields that meaning and accounts for all the properties in
(3)-(8).
The paper is organized as follows: The first section is devoted to elucidate the intricacies of
the modality in (1); the second one deals with the Dative NP and establishes what kind of
argument it is. Next, I present my initial proposal (sections 3. and 4.), and finally (section
5.), in the light of the discussion in the previous sections, I turn to the role of the adverb
mentioned with respect to (7).
1. The Kind of Modality in (1).
For the purposes of establishing the kind of modality behind (1), I will rely on the
theoretical frame established by Kratzer (1991) and her previous work.
Kratzer’s main idea is that modality is a relativized notion. Modal words are associated with
a variety of readings: epistemic, dynamic, deontic, ... Kratzer claims that modal words are
not really ambiguous, rather they just need some further specification about how they
4The Past morphemes inflect for Gender and Number, but not for Person; they are the following: -lo
(Neut.Sg.), -la (Fem.Sg.), -l (Masc.Sg.) and -li for the plural.
(Relativized) Modality, Datives and Reflexive Suffixes Benedicto
3
should be understood. Take, for instance, the cases in (9):
(9) a. I can lift this box
b. I can be the person you are looking for
In (9)a., can is interpreted as ‘can. given my physical ablilities’, as a posibility in view of
my physical circumstances (and the general characteristics of our world). In (9)b., on the
other hand, can is more readily interpreted as ‘can. in view of the available evidence’, a
possibility given what we know.
This additional information needed to properly interpret a modal word, the kind of modality
involved, is what Kratzer calls Conversational Background. The modal force of a modal
word has to be interpreted with respect to these Conversational Backgrounds.5
The Conversational Background may be provided contextually (as in (9)), or linguistically,
as with the italicized phrase in (10):
(10) In view of what  you are telling me, I can be the person you are looking for.
Conversational backgrounds that determine the facts relevant for the interpretation of a
modal are realistic conversational backgrounds;6 they are also referred to as Modal Bases:
In (9)a., the relevant facts are my physical conditions or circumstances - the modal base is,
thus, circumstantial; in (9)b., the relevant facts are the information that we have (what we
know): the modal base is epistemic. In both cases, the modal force (possibility) is
interpreted relative to the corresponding modal base. The table in (11) gives an overview:
(11)
Modal Force Modal Base  
(Realistic Conversational Background: facts)
possibility circumstantial
necessity (in view of the circumstances)
epistemic
(in view of the evidence)  
Let us consider another example:
(12) I could go to Paris.
I could go to Paris  may be interpreted as something like ‘in view of my physical conditions
or my general circumstances (maybe I had a car, or maybe I was the only one that didn’t
catch that virus, or maybe I found someone to feed my cats), in view of all that, the
possibility existed for me of going to Paris’. In this case, the modal is interpreted with
respect to a Circumstantial Modal Base. If, on the other hand, I could go to Paris is
interpreted as ‘given what we know and how things are developing (we know that the
company has established prizes for people reaching some sales quotas, we know that the
prize for this year is a trip to Paris, and that my sales volume is reaching that quota...), it is
possible… for me to go to Paris’, then the possibility modal is being interpreted with
5More concretely, sentences headed by modals express a proposition only if a conversational background
has been provided. For details, cf. Kratzer (1991).
6Cf. section 5. for discussion of the other type of Conversational Background that Kratzer (1991) identifies.
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respect to an Epistemic Modal Base:7
(13) a. Given my circumstances (physical or other), I could go to Paris.
<- Circumstantial Modal Base.
b. Given what we know and how things are developing, I could go to Paris.
<- Epistemic Modal Base.
Cast in the more traditional terms of accessibility relations, modal bases determine for every
world the set of worlds which are accessible from it, that is, they determine precisely the
accessibility relations. Epistemic modal bases are functions that assign to every possible
world a set of propositions which constitute the body of knowledge in that world;
circumstantial modal bases are functions that assign to every possible world w a set of
propositions which constitute the facts about the nature of things in w.
In general, as  mentioned above, Modal Bases may be provided contextually, like in the
case of (12). Notice also that in the case of (12) under the interpretation of (13)a., the range
of circumstances that are relevant is very wide. This doesn’t have to be so: it is a well-
known fact about modals that they can specialize for the kind of circumstances involved,
the circumstances that are relevant for the interpretation of the modal.8 Certain modal may
require some special kind of circumstances to be the relevant ones for its interpretation. The
Hungarian case in (14) is an example.
(14) a. én nem tudok aludni  (nagy a zaj) (Hungarian)
     I   not    can     sleep       big the noise
‘I can’t sleep (because the noise is too big)
b.én nem bírok aludni  (nekem fáj a fejem)
    I   not    can     sleep       me:DAT hurts the head-my
‘I can’t sleep (because I have a headache)’
The modal word tud in (14)a. specializes for external circumstances: the relevant facts for
my inability to sleep are those noises out there. On the other hand, bír in (14)b. specializes
for internal circumstances: in this case I can only blame my own headache for my sleepless
night.  This is summarized in the table in (15):
(15) Modal Force Modal Base
tud possibility circumstantial - external
bír possibility circumstantial - internal
Let me now go back to (1). (1) can be uttered in a situation in which, having had all sorts
of problems, my mind is too upset to concentrate on any reading. In that sense, it can be
rendered by (8), repeated here as (16)a., b. or c.:
7This has a direct counterpart in what has been called Root and Epistemic modality, respectively: root
modality comprises all occurrences of modals with a circumstantial modal base, and epistemic modality
comprises all occurrences of modals with an epistemic modal base. (Cf. Kratzer (1991, p.650).
8Further differentiation within an epistemic modal base is as possible as within a circumstantial modal
base.
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(16) a. I don’t feel like reading.
b. I’m not in the mood for reading.
c. I can’t read.
However, (1) cannot be uttered in a situation in which, having eaten a lot, my stomach is
too upset to let me do anything else but lie down in bed and digest whatever I ate. In that
situation, all English options in (16) are adequate, but not so the sentence in (1).
In general, whenever the reasons for one’s (in)ability can be traced back to one’s mental
state, the configuration in (1) can be used. Whenever the reasons or circumstances are of a
different nature (physical, external or internal, or any other kind), (1) will be inadequate.
From this and similar evidence, we can say, then, that the circumstances that are relevant in
interpreting utterances like (1) must be psychological in nature, and conclude that the
modality in (1) is specialized for psychological circumstances.
The modality in (1) is, thus, interpreted as in (17):
(17) Modality in (1):
Modal Force Modal  Base
Possibility Circumstantial - psychological
[in view of (x’s) psychological circumstances]
Now we can understand why the English alternatives in (16) were adequate in some cases,
but not in others. (16)c. picks up the modal force in (1), namely possibility; (16)a. and b.
pick up the psychological restriction on the (circumstantial) modal base: that is what the
sentences in (16) share with (1). However, the ‘feeling’ of the English sentences (16)a.
and b. is not restricted to psychological feeling; it can also be a physical  feeling, and in that
sense, they depart from (1), and thus, become inadequate renditions of (1). In the same
line, English can is not restricted to psychological circumstances (although it accepts that
kind of modal base); so, whenever can is used without that restriction on its modal base, it
will become inadequate for something like (1). That is the case of the ‘too-much-eating’
scenario depicted above.
2. The Dative
Having established the kind of modality in (1), let me now turn to the nature of the Dative
NP.
2.1. Behaviour of Subject.
The Dative NP in DIRC shows the behaviour of a structural Subject. Like Nominative
subjects (and unlike oblique Dative constituents), the Dative NP in (1) can control PRO,
can be the antecedent for the anaphor sebja and, finally, it can also bind the anaphoric
possessive adjective svoj. This subject-like behaviour can be observed in (18) thru (20).
2.1.1. Control of PRO in Gerunds.
In general, the PRO in a Gerund construction, like the one in (18), can be controlled by the
Nominative subject of the main clause: this is the case of (18)a.. Oblique Datives, on the
other hand, cannot be the controllers for such PROs, as is shown in (18)b.
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The Dative of (1), however, patterns together with the Nominative in (18)a., and unlike the
oblique Dative in (18)b.: it is the controller for PRO, as (18)c. shows.9
(18) a. Jai    sosredotochenno  çitaju,    PROi    sidja     pod  lampoj
   I:NOM  engrossedly:ADV   read:1sgPRES            seat:GER   next   lamp
‘I get totally absorbed in the reading, while seating next to the lamp’
b. mamai         mnej      çitala,  PROi/*j  sidja     u    okna
     mom:NOM  me:DAT   read:FemPAST          seat:GER    by  window
‘Mom read to me, while she was seating by the window’ (NOT ‘...while I was sitting…’]
c. Mnei     ne      çitalos',      PROi   sidja      u   okna
  me:DAT    not   read:NeutPAST.RFL            seat:GER   by  window
‘I didn’t feel like reading/I couldn't read [given my psychological conditions],
  while seating by the window’
2.1.2. Antecedent for anaphor sebja.
In general, a Nominative subject can be the antecedent of the reflexive anaphor sebja
[(19)a.], but not so an oblique Dative [(19)b.]. In this case, again, one can observe the
same pattern as in (18): the Dative in (19)c., like the Nominative subject in (19)a. and
unlike the oblique Dative in (19)b., is the antecedent for sebja.
(19) a. U   sebjai     jai     xoroßo     rabotaju
    at  self:GEN  I:NOM   well:ADV  work:1sgPRES
‘At my place I work well’
b. U   sebjai/*j    mamai        mnej      çitala
    at    self:GEN     mom:NOM    me:DAT   read:FemPAST
‘At her place, my mother read for/to me’ / * ‘At my place, my mother read to me’
c. U  sebjai      mnei   xoroßo      rabotalos’
   at self:GEN     me:DAT   well:ADV  work:NeutPAST.RFL
‘At my place, I can work well [given my psychological circumstances]’
2.1.3. Antecedent for anaphoric possessive svoj.
As in the previous two cases, the Dative in (1) patterns together with Nominative subjects,
and unlike oblique Datives, with respect to the anaphoric possessive adjective svoj: the
Nominative NPs in (20)a. and b., and the Dative NP in (20)c. may be the antecedents for
svoj, whereas the oblique Dative in (20)b. cannot.
(20) a. jai         çitaju      v    svoeji      komnate
   I:NOM read:1sgPRES  in   own:PREP   room:PREP
‘I read in my own room’
b. mamai        mnej      çitajet      v    svoeji/*j      komnate
   mom:NOM   me:DAT   read:3sgPRES  in  own:PREP       room:PREP
‘My mother reads for me in her own room’ / *... in my own room’
9Contrary to Schoorlemmer’s 1994 claim that they cannot control (cf. her (52)c.). The problem with her
test is that she uses purpose infinitives and, as we shall see (2.2.), those are incompatible, for independent
reasons, with DIRC.
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c.Da!e  v   svoeji     komnate     mnei    ne      çitalos'
              even  in  own:PREP    room:PREP  me:DAT  NEG  read:3sgNeutPAST.RFL
‘Even in my own room I can't sleep [given my psychological  circumstances]’
2.2. Not Behaviour of an Agent.
On the other hand, the Dative NP in (1) does not show the behaviour and properties of an
Agent. More specifically, it does not tolerate the presence of Class I adverbs, claimed to
require an agentive NP in the clause,10 as the contrast in (21) shows:
(21) a. ja       naroçno / oxotno       tantsevala
    I:NOM deliberately/volontarily dance:FemPAST
‘I deliberately / volontarily danced’
b. *mne    naroçno / oxotno    ne    tantsevalos'
    me:DAT deliberately / volontarily  not  dance:NeutPAST.RFL
Likewise, sentences of the type in (1) do not accept purpose clauses, typically associated
with agentivity. See the contrast in (22):11
(22) a. ja      xoroßo     rabotala,     çtoby      ugodit'   svoemu   naçal'niku.
   I:NOM well:ADV work:FemPAST  so.that   please:INF  self’s:DAT  boss:DAT
‘I worked well to please my boss’
b. *mne  xoroßo      rabotalos',         çtoby   ugodit'   svoemu  naçal'niku.
   me:DAT well:ADV work:NeutPAST.RFL  so.that  please:INF  self’s:DAT  boss:DAT
2.3. The Meaning of the Dative NP.
Given all the previous evidence, i.e., that (i) the external argument of the verbs çitat’, ‘to
read’, rabotat’, ‘to work’ and tantsevat’, ‘to dance’ (those in (18)-(22)) is associated with
agent interpretations; that (ii) the Dative NP in (1), and for that matter, in (18)c.-(20)c.,
(21)b. and (22)b. does not have such an agentive interpretation; and (iii) that the verbs in
all those cases are unergatives with no other argument available, we can conclude that the
Dative NP in question is not the argument of the inflected verb itself.
The crucial point in understanding the nature of the Dative NP is its interpretation: the
Dative NP is interpreted as denoting the individual whose psychological circumstances are
relevant for the interpretation of the modality in (1) as established in (17).
The relevance of this fact, together with the evidence in this section 2. (showing that the
Dative is not the argument of the inflected verb), will become apparent in the next section
where I will elaborate on how the meaning of the dative NP interacts with the kind of
modality carried by (1).
10Cf. Jackendoff (1972).
11Even if the presence of purpose clauses is an instance of event-control rather than agent control, the
ungrammaticality of (22)b. may be an indication of the stativity of its predicate. But if the predicate is
stative, then, there can be no agent, which is precisely what we wanted to show.
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3. A Proposal
Before I make explicit my analysis, let me introduce a notion proposed in Brennan’s 1993
thesis: the difference between modal predicates and modal operators. Brennan identifies
two types of modals, as in (23):
(23) (VP-) Modals: Two Analysis12 [Brennan 1993:2.1.8]
modal predicate: "P"x (modal (^P)(x))
modal (VP-)operator: "P (modal (^P))
Modal predicates denote relations between individuals and properties; they take, thus, two
arguments, as opposed to modal operators that take only one ‘argument’.13 The ‘extra
argument’ of a modal predicate, the one denoting the individual, has the property of further
restricting the modal base. Remember that modals had to be interpreted with respect to a
modal base that determined the accessibility relations. In a modal predicate, the modal base
will be interpreted relative to its i-argument (the argument denoting the individual), in other
words, the modal base will be ‘keyed’ to the i-argument,14 the syntactic subject, in
Brennan’s work. Whenever the modal base of a given modal is keyed to the subject, we
can talk about a modal predicate.
Let’s consider an example, (9)a., repeated here:
(9) I can lift this box
 In (9) the modal base restricting the modal is ‘my (physical) circumstances’, the physical
conditions that are relevant for the interpretation of the modal are my physical conditions,
and not Thelma’s or Louise’s or Clark’s; the worlds where especifically my physical
conditions are the same, are the worlds that are accessible. The modal base (circumstantial)
is interpreted relative to the individual denoted by  “I”, it is interpreted as my circumstances;
in this sense, the modal base is keyed to the subject, and we can say that the subject is the
subject of the modal.
In this same sense, given that the Dative NP in (1) denotes the individual whose
psychological circumstances are relevant for the interpretation of modality, we can say that
the modal base is interpreted relative to (the denotation of) the Dative NP; in other words,
the modal base is keyed to (the denotation of) the Dative NP.
Summarizing our findings up to now: we have a modality specialized for psychological
circumstances; we have a Dative NP denoting the individual whose psychological
circumstances are relevant (i.e., restricting the modal base) and showing the behaviour of a
subject, and we have a notion of modal predicate which allows a modal to have two
arguments.
12The reference to VP in (23) is tied to her particular analysis of English modals, and is not crucial to the
analysis here.
13Notice the similarities with other treatments of root and epistemic modals as transitive or intransitive
verbs, or as control or raising predicates.
14In Kratzer’s account, modal bases involved sets of propositions; under Brennan’s account, she has to deal
with ‘bundles of property expressions’ (cf. 2.2.). For her final specific reformulation of accessibility
relations, cf. her section 2.2.3.
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Based on all this, I will propose the following:
(24) In DIRC [(1)] there is an empty modal head Ø#, a modal predicate [cf.(23)]associated with a possibility modal force interpreted with respect to a modal base
specialized for psychological circumstances [cf.(17)]. It selects two arguments,
denoting, respectively, an individual (the one for whom the possibility exists)
restricting the psychological modal base and realized by the Dative NP, and a
property.
The denotation of Ø# is a relation between individuals and properties.
Finally, then, the meaning of (1), according to the proposal in (24) is as in (25):
(25) Given my psychological circumstances, I can’t read (there is no possibility for me
to read).
and the syntactic representation for the modal projection, as in (26):
(26)
#Ø ['property' argument]
MP   ( = IP )
M'
NPdat
['individual' argument]
P   x (    (^P)(x))" " Ø#
This proposal captures the fact that, as mentioned in the previous section, the Dative NP
behaves like a non-agentive subject, indeed like the subject of a stative predicate, which is
in fact what it is: the subject of a modal predicate.
An interesting consequence of this proposal that analyzes the Dative NP as the subject of
the modal head, is that it accomplishes to unify (1) with other modal constructions in
Russian that also take a Dative subject, be it an overt modal as in (27)a. or again an empty
modal as in (27)b.:15
(27) a. vam           nuzhno            poexat’     v    sanatorij.
you.Pl:DAT  necessary:MOD-PRED   go:INF    to   hospital:ACC
‘You need to go to the hospital’
     b. mne        Ø     uxodit’. [from G&F (1991), their (6)]
    me:DAT  ‘must’  leave-INF
‘I have to leave’
15For an overview and proposal about how these subjects end up in the Dative, cf. Kondrashova (1994).
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4. The Property Argument.
In the proposal in (24), the empty modal denotes a relation between individuals and
properties. In the two previous sections I talked about the syntactic properties and semantic
contribution of the i(ndividual)-argument. This section will be devoted to the property
argument.
By the end of last section, the similarity in the syntactic realization of the i-argument among
different modal constructions (basically, those in (1) and (27)) was pointed out. Note,
however, that the syntax of the property argument is different in (1) and in (27). In (27) it
has the shape of an infinitive; in (1), on the other hand, it is represented by a tense inflected
verb with a reflexive suffix.
Infinitives may usually denote properties, but a tense inflected verb means that by the time
the sentence enters the interpretational component, that verb has raised to the head of IP
(whatever maximal projection one chooses as the highest one, but at least TP). And if we
assume a VP-internal subject hypothesis, the denotation of an IP is hardly that of a
property.
In order to get the inflected verb with the reflexive suffix to denote a property, I will make a
proposal based on an interpretational rule proposed for totally independent reasons in Heim
& Kratzer (1993).
But first, let’s determine the syntactic structure corresponding to this part of the tree. I will
assume a split inflexion, as in Chomsky (1993 and others). More specifically, I will follow
the tradition (begining with Borer (1982) and more recently adopted for romance SE in
Mendikoetxea (1992)) that analyzes clitics as the head of an Agr projection, and I will
propose that the reflexive suffix -sja  occupies the head of AgrsP, as shown in (28)
below.16 Notice that, as mentioned in section 2., the verbs that appear in DIRC are
unergatives, thus, there is only one Agro for -sja to head. Given the characteristics of -sja,
namely its pronominal nature,  and at the same time its lack of specific featural content,17 I
will assume that -sja is the minimal expression of a pronominal head, that is, that its
contents consists of just an index.
Since the inflected verb has an external agent $-role to assign but there is no overt element
for it, and since the presence of tense rules out the possibility of PRO, let us assume that
the non-overt element bearing the agentive external $-role of the inflected verb is pro.
Assuming, a VP-internal subject hypothesis, a pro  is, thus, generated in the Spec-VP as
the realization of the agentive argument of the verb, and raised to Spec, TP  to check its
Case.
16The claims about the syntactic structure of DIRC concern the structure of the configuration at the
interface level of LF. No claim is made about the derivation at the point of Spell Out.
17It has no specific marking for either Gender or Number or Person.
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(28)
TP
pro
 t
V-sja
Agr  P
v VP
i
s
 t v tpro
[property argument]
i
The crucial elements in this representation are the suffix -sja and the pronominal empty
subject pro. As a pronominal, pro is just a variable. On the other hand, I have proposed
that -sja just carries an index (in fact, is just an index).
The main idea behind the solution that I will propose is that the -sja suffix, or its index, acts
as a "-operator, binding the variable introduced by pro.18 For totally independent reasons,
Heim and Kratzer (1993) propose a rule that accomplishes just that, the rule of Predicate
Abstraction:
(29) Predicate Abstraction Rule
For any variable assignment g:
if % is a branching node whose daughters are an index i and a node &,
then [[%]]g is that function f such that, for any x'D, f(x)= [[&]]g x/i.
If we look back at (28) now, we'll see that that structure fits (29) perfectly: %, the
branching node, is AgrsP, and its daughters are an index (namely, the one of -sja) and &,
the TP node in (28). The effect that the index i in Agr has is to make a predicate out of the
sentence ‘x reads’, namely, the predicate that denotes (the characteristic function of) the set
{x'D: x reads}.
The interpretation of the AgrsP, then, fits perfectly as the first argument of the modal head,
as specified in (23) and (24).19
18If -sja in AgrSo is a "-operator for pro, and if there is something like existential closure at the level of
VP, then we might have an extra reason to move pro out of the VP: within the VP pro is a variable under
the scope of existential closure and the "-operator could not bind it.
19An additional advantage of treating -sja as a "-operator is that it formally captures the idea traditionally
associated with the different manifestations of SE/SI in various languages that it “absorbs” or “suppresses”
a $-role. The consequences of such a suggestion are far-reaching and, thus, out of the scope of this work,
but worth exploring.
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The final representation is as in (30):
(30)
#Ø
MP   ( = IP )
M'
NPdat
TP
pro
 t
V-sja
Agr  P
v VP
i
s
 t v tpro
['property' argument]
i
P   x (    (^P)(x))" " Ø#
['individual' argument]
5. The Adverb as the Ordering Source.
Let us finally talk about  the property mentioned in (33): the presence of an adverb. I repeat
the example in (31).
(31) mne     xoroßo    çitaetsja
me:DAT well:ADV  read:3sgPRES.RFL
I will begin by laying out the properties and characteristics of the adverbs that may appear
in DIRC; next I will present the theoretical account for their presence, based again on
Kratzer’s notion of relativized modality.
Initial descriptions of these adverbs present them as ‘manner’ adverbs. In fact, they are not
manner adverbs or, rather, they are not interpreted as manner adverbs. Although in some
other contexts they could be interpreted as such, this is not the case in DIRC. The contrast
in (32) between a DIRC and its active counterpart is clear in this respect:
(32) a. mne xoroßo    rabotaetsja
me:DAT well:ADV  work:3sgPRES-RFL
b. ja   xoroßo    rabotaju
I:NOM well:ADV  read:1sgPRES
In (32)b., the active version (‘I work well’ or ‘I am working well’), the adverb xoroßo can
be interpreted as qualifying the way in which my work is going: my work is good.
However, in (32)a. such an interpretation is unavailable. (32)a. cannot mean ‘I can work
well (given my psychological circumstances)’.
In the same line, adverbs that are clearly and unequivocally manner adverbs lead to
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ungrammatical results:
(33) *mne    vnimatelno  /  octoro!no    rabotaetsja
me:DAT carefully1:ADV  carefully2:ADV work:3sgPRES-RFL
According to McConnell-Ginet’s 1982 classification of adverbs, manner adverbs are what
she calls Ad-V, adverbs whose meaning combines directly with the verb’s meaning. To
this same group belong adverbs like mnogo  ‘a lot, very much’. These too are
ungrammatical in DIRC contexts:
(34) *mne mnogo çitaetsja
 me:DAT  a.lot  read:3sgPRES-RFL
The adverbs in DIRC, thus, are not manner adverbs. What are they, then? They are second
order evaluative predicates, the same kind that can form sentences like the following:
(35) xoroßo20         (bylo),     ßto          vy        prißli
well:ADV (be:NeutPAST)  that:COMP you:2pl  come:PluPAST
‘It is (was) good that you came’
The second restriction on the adverbs appearing in DIRC is that they have to be
interpretable as psychological states; such is the case of skuçno ‘boringly’ or udobno
‘comfortable’:
(36) a.   emu           zivetsja             skuçno21
    him:DAT  live:3sgPRES.RFL  boringly:ADV
b. mne       udobno          çitalos’,      (   sidja    pod lampoj )
   me:DAT   comfortably  read:NeutPAST.RFL  seat:GER  next   lamp
Note also that the gloss that is sometimes offered for mne xoroßo rabotaetsja (as in (32)a.)
is something like ‘I am working and I feel well about it’. Also, if ‘I am working well’ is
used for the same example, ‘well’ is used as a subject-oriented adverb, as in the sense of
‘I’m feeling well in my working/as I work’, never as conveying any information about the
quality of your work (as already pointed out some paragraphs above): one could easily utter
(32)a., in a situation where the work performed is actually pretty lousy. This fact about the
interpretation of xoroßo in (32)a. gives further support to the claim that the adverbs in
DIRC must be interpretable as psychological states.
To confirm this point, take a predicate adverb like va!no ‘important(ly)’, also a second
order predicate like xoroßo in (35) but not a psychological state predicate; if such a
predicate is used in a DIRC context, the result is ungrammatical:
(37) *mne        va!no           rabotaetsja
me:DAT  importantly  work:3sgPRES.RFL
20Although xorosho in (35) is superficially ambiguous between the short neutral form of the adjective, and
the adverb form, the stress pattern in other adverbs of the same type makes it clear that they are actually
adverbs (e.g., ból’no[adv], ‘painful(ly)’ vs. bol’nó[adj], ‘sick, ill’).
21There is a considerable variation among speakers with respect to the degree of acceptability of examples
like (36). In general, (36)a. seems to fare better than (36)b. Cf. fn. 26 for some speculation.
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Finally, the last restriction is that adverbs in DIRC have to provide one of the ends of a
gradation line, like the following pairs do: xoroßo ‘good’ vs ploxo ‘bad’; legko ‘easy’ vs.
trudno ‘difficult’; otliçno ‘perfect’ vs. skverno ‘bad’. Other psychological state predicate
adverbs are acceptable as far as they can be (secondarily) understood as providing a line of
gradation; such is the case of skuçno ‘boring’ (as opposed to veselo ‘fun’) or grustno ‘sad’
(as opposed to radostno ‘happy’), or even !utko (not in the primary sense of ‘horribly’,
but in the secondary sense of ploxo ‘bad’ - and, thus, opposed to xoroßo ‘good’).
Summarizing, then, the restrictions on the kind of adverb appearing in DIRC are the
following:
 (38) a. they are second order evaluative predicates (not manner adverbs);
b. they must be interpretable as psychological states;
c. they provide some sort of gradation line.
Let me now go back to Kratzer’s Relativized Modality. Relativized Modality says that a
modal is to be interpreted relative to a conversational background. In section 1, we saw that
conversational backgrounds determining the facts relevant for the interpretation of a modal
were realistic conversational backgrounds; and we called them modal bases (cf. (11)).
Actually, this is not the whole picture. There is a second conversational background, one
that has to do with ideals, like ‘what we want’,’what is good for you’, ‘what is normal’...
Conversational backgrounds having to do with ideals are normative conversational
backgrounds.
If modal bases (realistic conversational backgrounds) determine the accessibility relations,
if they determine for each world the set of worlds that are accessible from it, the second
conversational background, the normative one, induces, for each world, an ordering on
that set according to how closer or further away the accessible worlds are from the ideal,
determined by ‘what is good’, ‘what we want’, etc...22 This second conversational
background, thus, functions as the ordering source. The ordering induced by the ordering
source is on the basis of a graded notion of modality, as found in expressions like
easily/hardly possible or good/slight possibility.23
The interpretation of modals is, thus, relativized to two parameters:24
(39) Modal Force Conversational Background
Modal Base  Ordering Source
(Realistic: facts) (Normative: ideals)
possibility circumstantial bouletic  (wishes)
necessity (in view of the circumstances) deontic (duties)
epistemic doxastic (beliefs)
(in view of the evidence)  stereotypical
. . .
22Again, this conversational background related to ideals can be provided contextually. In (12) under the
interpretation of (13)b., for example, a stereotypical ordering source could be at play: ‘Given what we know
(how things are developing), and given the normal course of events, I could go to Paris’.
23Note that the range of modifiers accepted by modals is quite limited: they are restricted to the ones
mentioned in the main text and the like, which basically work as degree modifiers. This observation makes
special sense in the context of a gradation (an ordering) having  been induced by the ordering source.
24For the advantages of this view on modals over a more standard analysis and for the specifics of how the
ordering is induced, cf Kratzer (1991).
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What I want to propose here is that the adverbs we have been dealing with in this section
represent precisely the ‘ideals’ (‘what feels good’, ‘what feels comfortable’, ...), according
to which the modality will also be evaluated. In other words, in the same way the phrase
‘in view of what you are telling me’ was the overt linguistic representation of the
(epistemic) modal base in (10), the adverbs xoroßo, udobno in (32) or (36) represent the
linguistic contribution to the ordering source, the second parameter needed for the
interpretation of a modal.
In DIRC, the empty modal head is evaluated relative to two parameters: a (psychological)
circumstantial modal base and an ordering source. The psychological circumstantial modal
base determines the set of worlds that are accessible; the ordering source, contributed to by
the adverb when present,25 induces an ordering in that set, according to how close of far
away they are from that ideal.
If this is so, the meaning of a sentence like (40) is as in (41):
(40) mne       udobno       çitalos’,      (    sidja   pod lampoj )
me:DAT comfortably read:NeutPAST.RFL    seat:GER next   lamp
(41) a .
Modal Modal Relativizer  (CB)     1st 2nd
expression force <modal base; ordering source> argument argument
Ø# possibility circumstantial;udobno     çitalos’ mne
(psychological);‘what feels comfortable’ ‘read’ ‘me’
b. Given my psychological state, the possibility exists for me, given what feels
comfortable for me, of reading.
As Kratzer points out, not every kind of modal base can combine with every kind of
ordering source; epistemic modal bases, for instance, take ordering sources related to
information. In this sense, one can better understand the requirement that the adverb
appearing in DIRC be a psychological predicate adverb [cf. (38)b]: if there is a correlation
between the kind of modal base and the kind of ordering source, it is no surprise that a
modal base restricted to psychological circumstances requires an ordering source related to
psychological states.
Likewise, if the adverb is the linguistic contribution to the ordering source, which is in the
base for a graded notion of modality, it is also non surprising that the adverb provides a
‘gradation line’ [(38)c] along which graded notions can be established.26
6. Conclusions.
To summarize, then, in this paper I have presented data concerning DIRC, a Russian
configuration showing implicit modality, illustrated in (1), that can best be accounted for
under Kratzer’s notion of Relativized Modality.
25Otherwise the context is always an excellent source to provide conversational backgrounds.
26This view applies to those dialects that consider adverbs like udobno ‘comfortable’ and skuçno ‘boringly’
as acceptable. Those other dialects in which condition (38)b. is not applicable, would consider adverbs as
simple degree words to mark the corresponding graded notion of modality, like easily in ‘easily possible’, as
specified in Kratzer (1991). Cf. fn. 23.
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I have explained the properties (3)-(8) associated with DIRC by postulating an empty
modal head, a modal predicate with two arguments denoting a relation between individuals
and properties [cf. (24) and (30)]; following Kratzer, I have shown that the interpretive
peculiarities of such modal head can be best explained by a modal base restricted to
psychological circumstances. Moreover, I have shown that the Dative NP argument is in
fact the argument of such modal (the one denoting the individual), and I have proposed that
the -sja suffix on the verb acts as a "-operator, providing the ‘property’ argument for the
modal. Finally, I explained the presence of the adverb as the linguistic contribution to the
ordering source associated with the modal.
Many other questions remain to be answered about DIRC. Hopefully the proposal
developed in this paper will contribute to find some answers.
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